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Caligula's Horse 
Abstract 
If I had not been, since boyhood, sceptical of all forms of address, by which I mean prose spoken in 
public, I would not have been invited to address you this morning, since the honour you have paid me is 
the very one I have been determined to avoid because I write verse. Public prose contains in it an 
affability, in fact, a superiority that is political. It must contain charm, however contorted its syntax; it must 
communicate, however high-pitched its subject; and most horrible of all to a poet (a word that makes me 
nauseous when I apply it to myself), it must make sense. It is the very opposite of the perpetual ignorance 
of poetry, the induced chaos from which a poem begins. I am perhaps perpetuating this chaos now, 
because it is very difficult, almost impossible, not in my nature, to make sense. Because I do not know 
what sense is, certainly because I know it is not common but rare, I have avoided writing critical or 
philosophical prose for all of my life. 
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opening address delivered at Eight Conference on West Indian Literature, Mona, 
Jamaica, May 1988. 
If I had not been, since boyhood, sceptical of all forms of address, by which 
I mean prose spoken in public, I would not have been invited to address you 
this morning, since the honour you have paid me is the very one I have been 
determined to avoid because I write verse. Public prose contains in it an 
affability, in fact, a superiority that is political. It must contain charm, 
however contorted its syntax; it must communicate, however high-pitched 
its subject; and most horrible of all to a poet (a word that makes me nauseous 
when I apply it to myself), it must make sense. It is the very opposite of the 
perpetual ignorance of poetry, the induced chaos from which a poem begins. 
I am perhaps perpetuating this chaos now, because it is very difficult, almost 
impossible, not in my nature, to make sense. Because I do not know what 
sense is, certainly because I know it is not common but rare, I have avoided 
writing critical or philosophical prose for all of my life. 
Typing this last word I made an error. I wrote the word 'love' instead of 
the word 'life', and have corrected it to mean what I intended. To mean what 
I intended is what this public prose would have me believe, but to discover, 
through a typographical error, what is accidental but also true is to leave in 
the error and write 1 have avoided writing critical or philosophical prose 
for all of my love'. That is one part of the poetic process, accident as 
illumination, error as truth, typographical mistakes as revelation. Auden 
once received proofs of a poem called 'Iceland', or about Iceland, in which 
he had originally written 'and the poets have names for the sea' but which 
came back from the printer as 'and the ports have names for the sea', so 
Auden seized on the printer's error with a spasm of revelation equal in its 
shock of delight to the laser beam that unhorsed Saul on the Damascus road, 
and kept the typo. 'And the poets have names for the sea' is very good but 
pompous, but 'the ports have names for the sea' is not only epical but 
fantastically accurate. The provinciality and hermetic variations of the 
separate, terrified or possessing faith of those small wharves for that eternal 
force outside their ragged limits, the bays like mouths all pronouncing the 
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word sea, naming it separately and self-assuredly, thanks to the astigmatism 
of a printer, or thanks perhaps to Auden's calligraphy, made a line of verse 
that makes another poet gasp with delight. 
Besides I have always thought in two margins. It has been the rigid 
benediction of my life, and to think in two margins - one on the right, and 
one on the left, obviously - is to serve a life-long sentence. To live out a pun. 
By a life-long sentence I mean both the sweet and chafing prison which the 
soul chooses and which it calls (since apparently everything must have its 
noun) poetry, but it is also to see poems as simply parentheses, asides of that 
life-long sentence, as now a phrase of Dylan Thomas's springs to mind: 'that 
poetry is statements made on the way to the grave'. So, you see what happens 
when poets are asked to think with only one margin, that of the left, unless 
they are Korean, or Hebrew, writing in the wrong direction, but still with 
the sense of that other approaching margin, that versus at the end of which 
the plough turns, those primary gardens always laid in squared ftirrows; but 
to be a creature who always thinks of two margins, left and right as the poem 
is being made, who believes as much in the right-hand margin as he or she 
does in the left, is more than a pun about politics. The business of politics is 
the business of discourse, and the language of discourse is prose, the 
language of one margin only, and that one margin, in politics, may be called 
right when it is left and left when it is right. 
This is not only what conftjses those who listen to political addresses but 
what reduces cities to rubble and incinerates generations who mistake the 
margins. But also, this business of margins, of making sense, of saying what 
one means, is the occupation of tyrants, of those who can make four-hour 
tirades without interruption, without self-contradiction, without that 
ignorance which the poet believes in, without a sense of horizon, and 
certainly from the conviction that the tyrant-speaker must believe that he 
owns both margins. If tyrants had to compose their tirade in verse, if critics 
had to write criticism in regular metre, we would have less argument and 
more accidental, even contradictory, essays. Pope said it in one couplet; but 
the proper study of mankind, as he points out, is an inferior occupation 
compared to the question of God. 
Because this is an injunction to critics: that their subject is not literature 
but God, or the gods, that poets should be judged by their approach towards 
this subject, and the source of that subject is chaos, ignorance, and its emblem 
is (how sweet Latin sounds in such contexts) Domintis iUummatio mea, Lord, 
who art the light of my life. The moment when Auden, in a flash that is like 
a seam in this chaos, like a light that comes from what he had no intention 
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of writing, wrote the word 'ports' for the word 'poets' - that is what I would 
be more happily engaged in this morning. 
But there also comes a time when we pay for all we have tried to do by 
being asked to practise, to honour, its opposite, when a poet who has earned 
some respect from his colleagues is asked by critic-philosophers this 
question: 'Yes, we know you can write poetry, but can you think?' And I 
confess with a right-hand margin and left-hand margin combination of 
arrogance and humility that I do not know how to think. Not to know what 
to think is the bewilderment of the normal human predicament in a political 
context. And so we are told what to think by popes, by parsons, by lecturers, 
and apparently now by me. Because my position here is elective, political, 
with frightening dangers, the most honest posture I could assume is that of 
a shrug. For that shrug - whether it be the grunt of a furrowed-forehead 
primate or of a hermit who has taken a vow of exterior silence - is what 
angers systems, what infuriates the right-hand margin. The poet chooses his 
prison so early that it makes the prison cell of the tyrant a repetition, it makes 
the cell of the monk theatrical. Besides, the silence of the hermit is what 
makes him loquacious, garrulous in his conversations with the silent 
language of trees, seas, stars, crabs, his ancestors, stones and squirrels, and 
God. 
But now it has happened: the seduction of authority. Now I am like the 
tyrant, the orderer, the one who says 'Listen, I will reveal, I shall guide, I 
shall confirm expectation, I shall play by the rules.' The tyrant mounts the 
platform and the hundreds of thousands in the public square are crying 
'Convince me', the parson ascends the pulpit and the congregation is praying 
'Convert me', the poet ascends to the lectern and the moment he is 
bemedalled or laurelled like a competing athlete, or some betting pool of 
literature's favourite horse, he becomes the pet of the crazy emperor, he 
becomes a critic. He has sublimated himself. 
How obvious this is, that a poet should sneer at critics. You see, even in 
this, behaviour of a certain predictability is confirmed. Critics have their own 
form of masochism, because once they have elected the tyrant to pronounce, 
the parson to preach, the medalled and laurelled athlete or the crowned 
horse of Caligula to say a few words into the microphone like Mr. Ed, they 
are also saying with the penitential fury of their self-Inquisition 'Insult us, 
tell us we are dirt, preserve that sublimity to which we have elevated you 
once you remember that we, who supposedly speak sense on behalf of the 
mob, can bring you down as fervently, remember we are the ones who make 
sense, the ones who preferred that you think for us.' 
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This too is tiieatrical, and only part of the truth. The margin on the right 
has dissolved like a horizon in a fog of its own making, a required 
performance of a half-lie - because since boyhood I have delighted in 
criticism. I cherished the essays of Eliot not because of his perceptions but 
because of their quotations. They induced in me the truest humility: that is, 
the desire to imitate, to imprison myself within those margins. Since then a 
lot of dead fish have beached on the sand. Mostly the fish are French fish, 
and off their pages there is the reek of the fishmonger's hands. I have a 
horror not of that stink, but of the intellectual veneration of rot, because 
from the far-off reek which I get from the stalls of the Academy, there is now 
a school of fishermen as well as schools of fish, and these fishmongers are 
interested in examining the disembowelled entrails of poetry, of marketing 
its guts and its surrounding conversation of flies. When French poetry dies 
the dead fish of French criticism is sold to the suckers. 'Moby Dick is nothing 
but words, and what are words, and what do I mean when I say Moby Dick, 
and if I say Moby Dick what exactly do I mean?' It convinces one that Onan 
was a Frenchman, but no amount of masturbation can induce the Muse. 
What do I mean by masturbation? Well, you take your hand and you write 
firom the left-hand margin and stop when you have achieved some spasm of 
self-recognition that may not breed but will appear to conceive, and that is 
known as literary philosophy and without any danger of arrest by the 
spiritual police, it is what I am demonstrating now. 
I cannot think because I refuse to, unlike Descartes. I have always put 
Descartes behind the horse, and the horse is Pegasus - not the hotel I am 
staying in at the moment, but the other Pegasus, the one with the wings. 
What I believe is: I don't know how to think therefore I am. I am one who 
cannot accept these processes, of games of self-contradiction, of essays on 
poetry, any more than I can accept the right-hand margin of History, which 
begins, in our language, firom the left and proceeds without trim, without 
metre, without that closing question of the couplet until it satisfies itself with 
cause and effect. This ignorance is old. It is the future of the Caribbean. 
Historians say now, it all depends on what you mean by History. To me 
that is no dififerent firom saying it all depends on what you mean by prison, 
what you mean by church, what you mean by a cobbled alley in Lisbon, an 
abandoned barracoon at the back of a plantation which tourists photograph. 
The real question is 'What do you mean by Time?' And it is here that 
historians had better secure their wristwatches or sundials, because we have 
to be careful of blasphemy, those of us whose religion is verse. The 
imagination is a territory as subject to invasion and seizure as any far 
province of Empire, so today when the sellers of dead fish claim whatever 
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they claim (because honestly I never think of them), and when historians 
are willing to join poets in defining history as one aspect of imagination -
that is, memory - it is then that poets have to be mauled and abused. Tyrants 
are failed artists. They paint in secret, they compose verses in secret, but 
they sculpt their own images publicly. The last thing they have, like 
historians, is imagination. A historian dare not imagine, a poet dare not 
think, certainly not in the way that he is expected to. That is Stalin murdering 
Mandelstam. History is memory, but it is not creative memory. 
And what is the difference between what the historian (and literary 
criticism is a branch of history) remembers, and what the poet remembers? 
Time. To the dictator time is a given period of which he is terrified - for him 
there is no consolation in the fact that his bronze image will be at least bad 
art or that the bard who sings his achievements can take permanent revenge 
by writing badly about him. The superficial idea of art as immortal is not 
what I mean: this is a prosaic idea of time, the immortality of art. To the 
poet, there is no word for this dimension of memory, and the wonder of 
poetry is that it does not mean time to be defined temporally any more than 
God dare be defined by that sense of moving firom the left: margin to the 
right to arrive at some proof 
The young poet is a blessed being. If there is one now in this audience, I 
invite him or her to sneer, to turn away fi-om these linear pronouncements 
with that sacred contempt with which I refused, by the grace of God, to 
believe, to prefer instead the grace that waits for the accidents of the 
print-setter who changed poets to ports, to the earlier error I made when I 
wrote either life for love of love for life, I have now forgotten which, and to 
see, as something of a public figure but still I hope, a hermit, a hider, a 
protector of silences, the vow I took as a boy not to listen. I have a fi-iend in 
Saint Lucia who lives in a wonderfiil cove over the hill from a luxury 
beach-hotel. He wrote poetry once, and he is also an important official in 
Government, and in fun once I called him the only public hermit I know. 
That is what, I am sure, in spite of the honour, you would have me remain. 
Thank you. 
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